Understandably, some will see this as counterintuitive. Indeed, the counterinsurgent-or counter-insurrectionist (a term taken from historian Jeremy Black)-is always seeking a limited political objective because they wish to preserve the regime and its control.

It is the counterinsurgent who is fighting the war for a limited political objective. If the insurgents want the overthrow of the regime this implies a high value on the object for the insurgents as well as the leaders and supporters of the regime that is now protecting itself. This is also true even if the political objective is clothed in religious rhetoric.Īs always, the value of the political objective or aim is key. In either case, the primacy of politics reigns supreme. The North Vietnamese sought the destruction of the South Vietnamese regime, but also the ousting of the US from South Vietnam. The insurgents may also have different objectives against different opponents. Mao Tse-Tung’s Communists sought an unlimited political objective-the overthrow of the Chinese Nationalist regime. Do the insurgents want the overthrow of the regime (an unlimited political objective) or do they want something less, say, for example, 13 colonies in an imperial backwater. Insurrections can pursue limited or unlimited political objectives, which will depend upon the situation at hand. It is the political objective that provides the clearest basis for analysis, not the size of the force or the means and methods of warfare. Insurrections are invariably classified as limited wars because the insurgents-tactically-fight using traditional guerrilla warfare methods with forces that are usually (but certainly not always) small, weak, and poorly armed-at least initially. The Foundation for Analysis: The Political ObjectiveĪs with all wars, we must begin the analysis by understanding the political objectives sought. Unfortunately, space requires us to risk making the same error.

This failing can lead to simplistic recommendations for addressing one of the most complicated military problems. The literature suffers from an endemic lack of self-awareness on this point and does not deal with the reality that tactical fixes often cannot address the larger strategic challenges. The literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency is voluminous and this is certainly not the place to discuss it, and wars in which insurgency is the dominant factor are invariably described as “limited.” What we must point out is that much of the writing on these topics is tactical and thus not directly related to our discussion. Image: By Staff Sergeant Aaron Allmon – This Image was released by the United States Air Force with the ID 060203-F-7823A-008, Public Domain.

U.s. backing insurgency